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This paper bridges a historiographical gap in accounts of the prediction and discovery of the positron by
combining three ingredients. First, the prediction and discovery of the positron are situated in the
broader context of a period of ‘crystallisation’ of a research tradition. Second, the prediction and dis-
covery of the positron are discussed in the context of the ‘authentication’ of the particle. Third, the
attitude of the relevant scientists to both prediction and discovery are conceptualised in terms of the idea
of ‘perspectives’. It will be argued that by examining the prediction and discovery of the positron in the
context of authentication within a period of crystallisation, we can better understand disagreements
regarding the positron between relevant scientists (Dirac, Bohr, and Pauli) in the period 1931e34.
© 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The Solvay Conference of 1933 marks the recognition of the
positron as a new particle of matter. However, the discussions
during the conference brought out prior disagreements with regard
to the nature of the positron. Whilst the historical details of the
prediction and discovery of the positron have already been subject
to a reasonably complete existing literature (Darrigol, 1988;
Hanson, 1961; Kragh, 1990; Leone & Robotti, 2012; Pashby, 2012;
Roque, 1997), important questions related to the disagreements
attending the nature of the positron remain nevertheless puzzling.
In particular: Why were Bohr and Pauli so opposed to equating the
experimental particle with the Dirac-particle? Were their seem-
ingly mysterious attitudes born of dogmatic conservatism? What
factors led to their eventual change of heart?
This paper bridges a historiographical gap by offering a novel
combination of three ingredients. First, the prediction and discov-
ery of the positron are situated in the broader context of a period of
‘crystallisation’ of a research tradition. Second, the prediction and
discovery of the positron are discussed in the context of the
‘authentication’ of the particle. Third, the epistemic attitudes of the
relevant scientists are conceptualised in terms of the idea of ‘per-
spectives’. Crystallisation leads physicists to reevaluate coretd. This is an open access article uassumptions. In this context, scientists with different epistemic
perspectives may respond differentially to the same empirical
knowledge, this in turn may serve to impede any process of
authentication. In this paper it will be shown that examining the
prediction and discovery of the positron in the context of authen-
tication within a period of crystallisation can help explain the
mystifying attitudes of certain physicists both prior and throughout
the 7th Solvay Conference, particularly the epistemic attitudes of
Bohr and Pauli.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2
the necessary conceptual background is briefly summarised. Sec-
tion 3 gives an overview of the relevant historical context of the
crystallisation of a research tradition. Section 4 details Dirac's
prediction and the disagreements that ensued. In section 5 the
perspectives of Pauli and Bohr are evaluated, and in Section 6 the
process of the authentication of the positron is considered.2. Conceptual background
Following Laudan (1977), a research tradition can be understood
as “the set of assumptions… about the basic kinds of entities in the
world, assumptions about the proper methods to use for con-
structing and testing theories about those entities” (p. 97), in brief,
“a set of ontological and methodological ‘do's’ and ‘don'ts'” (p. 80).
Research traditions foster a variety of different theories which
normally inherit the set of assumptions of their parent researchnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1 Here, we follow De Cruz & De Smedt (2013), who introduce the idea of ‘pro-
ductive disagreement’ to describe situations in which, in the absence of new
decisive evidence, scientists are better off maintaining disagreement, as “main-
taining epistemic peer disagreement is valuable for furthering epistemic goals” (p.
170).
2 Chadwick's letter to Nature announcing the discovery of the neutron was
published on February 27, 1932, see Chadwick, (1932). For historical accounts of the
neutron discovery and ensuing controversies see Stuewer, (2012), and Bromberg,
1971.
3 For a description of the nuclear paradoxes see Pais (1991), pp. 330e332.
4 For details regarding the b-decay controversy see Brown & Rechenberg, 1988;
Guerra, Leone, & Robotti, 2014; Jensen, 2000; Stuewer, 2012, and Bromberg, 1971.
5 Bohr's ‘attack’ of the energy conservation principle is well known and has been
discussed in a variety of papers, most recently by Kragh (2017) and Guerra et al.
(2014); it will also be the subject of more detailed discussion in what follows.
6 For a review of the ‘new particles’ in the 1930, see Guerra & Robotti, 2018, ch. 5,
Stuewer, 2018, ch. 7, and Navarro, 2004.
7 This is not to say that the authentication of the neutron proceeded in an
entirely uncontroversial manner, but whilst its nature was debated, its existence
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tradition inwhich awealth of conceptual and empirical problems are
still in need of resolution. Empirical problems concern empirical
phenomena in need of explanation, whilst conceptual problems are
due to inconsistencies between the theories fostered by the
research tradition. The paradigmatic example of crystallisation is
quantum theory in the early 20th century (1900e1925), see for
example Kao (2015). Authentication then refers to the validation of
a particular empirical phenomena as a well established, genuine,
empirical effect. Unlike Laudan, in this paper authentication is not
restricted to the validation of experimental results, of which, in the
case of the positron there already exists a vast literature (Leone &
Robotti, 2012; Pashby, 2012; Roque, 1997 etc.). Whilst the experi-
mental authentication of the positron is instrumental to the
confirmation of the positron as a new particle of matter, the focus
here is on the theoretical authentication which was equally
instrumental to its proper recognition.
Physicists' epistemic attitudes can be described in terms of
‘perspectives’. A perspective can be understood as a sophisticated
theoretical framework that encompasses the set of theoretical interests
and background theoretical knowledge (principles and assumptions
equally) that a researcher or group of researchers can be said to hold at
any given time. A perspective represents the working stance of a
scientist. Perspectives are conceptual bookkeeping tools for
tracking relevant epistemic shifts in scientists' attitudes towards a
given conceptual or empirical problem. The notion of perspective,
as used here, does not encompass personal, idiosyncratic likes or
dislikes of the relevant scientists. Thus perspectives, insofar as they
can be reconstructed from primary and secondary historical sour-
ces, reflect the epistemic or theoretical attitude of a scientist, and
not their subjective, idiosyncratic attitude towards a given problem.
Tracking a scientist's perspective can be particularly useful in cases
where the solution to a particular conceptual or empirical problem
is under discussion and disagreement ensues. In particular, tracking
any relevant shifts in a scientist's perspective may help one un-
derstand the nature of the disagreement and thus lead to its res-
olution. Similarly to Laudan's theories, perspectives inherit the
theoretical assumptions of the research tradition. It is further worth
noting that the notion of perspective used here is different from the
notion of perspective as defined by perspectival realists such as
Massimi or Giere. Massimi (2018a, 2018b) takes perspectives to
encompass both “(i) the body of scientific knowledge claims
advanced by a scientific community at the time; (ii) the experi-
mental, theoretical, and technological resources available to the
scientific community at the time to reliably make those scientific
knowledge claims; and (iii) second-order (methodological-
epistemic) claims that justify the scientific knowledge claims
advanced”, and thus her notion of ‘perspective’ is closer to Laudan's
research tradition. In contrast to Massimi's notion, ‘perspective’ as
defined here is more localised, yet not as localised as Giere's
(2006a,b) perspectives. For Giere, a perspective is a ‘theoretical’
or ‘observational’ viewpoint afforded by a theory, whereas on the
view advanced here perspectives can encompass elements of
different theories at the same time.
In periods of crystallisation, perspectives can deviate from the
core assumptions of a research tradition and can affect the
authentication of certain phenomena. Crystallisation, being char-
acterised by both unsolved conceptual and empirical problems, and
sometimes, by rapid discoveries, can deepen and diversify the
reevaluation of core assumptions according to the theoretical in-
terests of a particular scientist. Thus, scientists with different per-
spectives may respond differentially to the same empirical
knowledge, hence impeding authentication. In the remainder of
this paper it will be argued that once examined against thebackground of crystallisation, the perspectives of Bohr and Pauli
towards the authentication of the positron are no longer puzzling.
3. Crystallisation
The basic argument put forward in this paper is that crystal-
lisation leads physicists to reevaluate core assumptions. In this
context, scientists with different perspectives may respond differ-
entially to the same empirical knowledge, and this in turn may
serve to impede any process of authentication. Furthermore, dis-
putes regarding authentication within crystallisation can lead to
productive forms of disagreement.1 Once understood against the
background of crystallisation, the puzzling perspectives of scien-
tists in regard to the authentication of an empirical phenomena
stop having a mystifying character. The first step in establishing the
basic argument of this paper is to put forward evidence of crys-
tallisation. Thus, this section will provide a brief account of the
main assumptions and of the main conceptual and empirical
problems of the early 1930s.
Up until the discovery of the neutron in 1932,2 most physicists
thought that there exist only two kinds of fundamental particles:
the proton and the electron. As a consequence of this, most phys-
icists believed that the atomic nucleus was made of protons and
electrons (see Stuewer, 2012; 2018). However, the confinement of
electrons inside the nucleus led to awealth of problems concerning
the stability of nuclei, their spin, and their statistics.3 In addition to
troubles with the structure of the nucleus, the continuous spectrum
of b-decay was still in need of explanation.4 Some of these diffi-
culties seemed so great that a breakdown of quantummechanics at
the nuclear level was not considered out of the question (see
Darrigol, 1988, p. 228). Thus before the discovery of new particles,
physicists struggled to apply the new quantum mechanics to nu-
clear phenomena and physicists such as Bohr, for example, called
into question core assumptions of the research tradition (e.g. the
energy conservation principle).5 Whilst in 1932 new particles were
discovered, these new discoveries did not immediately lead to so-
lutions to the aforementioned problems.6 Some of the particles
were accepted more readily than others, for example the neutron,7
whilst in other cases, such as the positron's, their discovery marked
the beginning of a long process of authentication. It is against this
background e which can be understood as a period of crystal-
lisation of a research tradition e that the prediction of the positron
was made and its authentication begun.
A major turn in relativistic quantum mechanics took place with
Dirac's derivation of his relativistic equation of the electron (Dirac,was accepted almost immediately.
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effect, were explained by introducing spin,9 yet neither spin nor
relativity were yet integrated in quantum mechanics (Kragh, 1981,
p. 44). With Dirac's equation, “spin was a necessary consequence,
the correct magnetic moment of the electron was obtained, the
anomalous Zeeman effect of atoms came out right, the Thomas
factor of the electron appeared automatically” (Pais, 1989, p. 95).
Despite these spectacular results, Dirac's theory of the electron had
also some undesirable consequences.10 The equation had four so-
lutions: two of the solutions referred to free electrons, i.e., electrons
with negative charge, and two solutions referred to electrons with
negative energy, i.e., electrons with positive charge e which could
not at the time be given any physical interpretation.11 Whilst the
negative energy solutions were not a new theoretical concept, as
they beset the Klein-Gordon equation as well, the negative energy
problem had not been carefully studied in relation to the Klein-
Gordon equation because this equation was considered theoreti-
cally problematic (it had no one-particle interpretation) and
empirically inadequate (it did not give the hydrogen fine struc-
ture).12 But since the Dirac equation gave such spectacular results,
the negative solutions couldn't be ignored, at least not indefinitely.
Dirac himself initially chose to ignore the negative solutions,13
but in light of the Klein paradox and the Klein-Nishina formula,14
some explanation of the difficulty of electrons having negative ki-
netic energy (henceforth the ‘± difficulty’) had to be found. How-
ever, since the negative energy solutions were not believed to be a
real phenomena, there was no easy way to provide a satisfactory
explanation to the ‘± difficulty’. Thus whilst not being an imme-
diate consequence of Dirac's relativistic equation of the electron, it
is the ‘± difficulty’ that led, by degrees, to the prediction of the
positron.15
Dirac's equation, though providing a range of excellent results,
added to the problem of crystallisation. The ‘± difficulty’ and a bit
later the ‘hole theory’ called into question core symmetry and
conservation assumptions, thus exacerbating the need for reeval-
uation. In the next section it will therefore prove instructive to trace
the sequence of events that led Dirac from initially dismissing the ‘±
difficulty’ to the ‘hole theory’ for at least two reasons. First, because
Dirac's theoretical prediction of the positron marks the first step in8 For Dirac's own recollections on the origin of the equation see Dirac (1983;
1973); Kuhn et al. (1962). For reviews on the origins of Dirac's equation see
Moyer (1981b) and Kragh (1981).
9 For an early history of the Spin-Statistics Theorem see Massimi (2005) and
Blum (2014).
10 For example, Moyer (Moyer, 1981a) notes that “Two metaphors e magic and
sickness e recur in recollections of early reactions to Dirac's theory. Oppenheimer,
for example, used both in close juxtaposition. The theory magically yielded prop-
erties of the electron from general formal considerations. But the theory was also
afflicted with the sickness of predicting properties not observed” (p. 1056).
11 “Only half of the solutions to the Dirac equation for an interacting electron refer
to the particle's negative charge; the other half can be shown to refer to a particle of
positive charge” (Kragh, 1990, p. 88).
12 Thanks to Alexander Blum for pointing out some of the problems related to the
Klein-Gordon equation.
13 “Since half the solutions must be rejected as referring to the charge þ e on the
electron, the correct number will be left to account for duplexity phenomena”
Dirac, 1928, p. 618.
14 Klein's paradox showed that “in some simple cases the Dirac electron would
behave in a patently absurd way” (Kragh, 1990, p. 89), whilst the Klein-Nishina
scattering formula “relied crucially on positive as well as negative energies”
(Kragh, 1990, p. 89).
15 Contrary to a naive account, the positron is not an immediate consequence of
Dirac's equation. In fact, Pashby (2012) notes that “The presence of negative energy
solutions was not enough to predict anti-matter: each of the negative energy states
had to be occupied by an electron for ‘anti-electrons’ (holes) to have physically
reasonable properties, and moreover properties which in detail turned out to be
instantiated by the positron” (p. 462).its authentication and also leads to further reevaluation of certain
core assumptions. Second, because the prediction of the positron
and reactions thereto constitute further evidence of crystallisation
and of its effects on authentication.
4. Pre-authentication
Dirac's first attempt to solve the ‘± difficulty’ was not only an
attempt to overcome the Klein paradox; it was also prompted by a
letter from Niels Bohr who foreshadowed more stringent problems
arising from the application of Dirac's equation to “nuclear elec-
trons”.16 Bohr alluded to the possibility that the ‘± difficulty’ “might
be said to reveal a contrast between the claims of conservation of
energy and momentum on one side and the conservation of the
individual particles on the other side” (Bohr, 1986, p. 547). Dirac's
response took the form of his first articulation of the ‘hole’ theory.
The hole theory assumes that there is an infinite sea of negative
electrons, in which “most stable states are occupied […] except
perhaps a few of small velocity” (Dirac, 1930a, p. 362). The unoc-
cupied states or the holes were initially identified by Dirac with
protons (Bohr, 1986, p. 549). Herman Weyl, also, independently
showed that the negative energy solutions could be explained away
by interpreting “the four differential equations as including the
proton in addition to the electron” (Weyl,1950, p. 225), only to later
dismiss this idea and conclusively show that holes could not be
protons. Weyl showed that the mass of electrons and holes is the
same,17 a conclusion supported also by Tamm and Oppenheimer
(Pais, 1987, p. 101). However, in between the two stages of Weyl's
proofs, Dirac showed why the immediate identification of a ‘hole’
with the proton a la Weyl (i.e., the early proof) was afflicted by a
number of problems which (Dirac's, 1930b, a) more elevated proof
of why the ‘holes’ should be identified with the protons seemed to
eschew.
The straightforward assertion “that a negative-energy electron
is a proton” generated, according to Dirac, paradoxes related to the
conservation of electric charge, conservation of momentum, and
concerns with regard to the physical reality of a negative electron
(Dirac, 1930b, a). The problematic nature of the negative-energy
electron, and hence its immediate identification with the proton,
consisted in the fact that it would have “less energy the faster it
moves and it will have to absorb energy in order to be brought to
rest” (Dirac, 1930a, p. 362) and it would be difficult to understand
how such a particle could ever be observed in nature. Finding away
around these difficulties whilst accounting for the conditions in
which the “unwanted solutions with negative kinetic energy for the
electron”18 could hold in the actual world, led Dirac to further
articulate his ‘hole theory’ and ingeniously explain why it would
seem that the proton is the ideal candidate for a hole. Dirac sub-
sequently thought that the hole theory went beyond the purely
mathematical considerations that led Weyl to associate the nega-
tive energy electrons with the protons. The hole theory showed
how “the states corresponding to a negative energy” can have
“some physical meaning” (Dirac, 1930a). Based on the assumption
that all the states of negative energy for an electron are occupied,
together with the fact that “an electronwith negative energymoves
in an electromagnetic field in the same way as an ordinary electron
with positive energy would move if its charge were reversed in
sign, so as to be þe instead of -e” (Dirac, 1930a), as well as
consideration of Pauli's exclusion principle, Dirac was led to “assert
that the hole is a proton” (Dirac, 1930a).16 See Darrigol (1988), Kragh (1990), and Pashby (2012), and for details.
17 See Pashby (2012) for more details. See also Weyl (1950).
18 See Dirac (1930b), p. 360.
20 Rosenfeld, in an interview with Oskar Klein, notes that “[t]here was a very
strong resistance in Copenhagen, from Bohr, when the announcement of the pos-
itive electron came. Bohr would not believe it; he would not believe it. He did not
make, and nobody here made the connection with Dirac's theory. I think somebody
may have mentioned Dirac theory, and then Bohr dismissed it by saying, ‘Oh, but
that is no theory. That is not a theory that one can believe in’” (Heilbron et al., 1963).
21 “I got used to say, that your prediction of the antielectron has no parallel in the
history of science. […] Your theoretical prediction about the existence of the an-
tielectron, being unstable in the ‘ordinary space’ outside the nucleus, seemed so
extravagant and totally new, that you yourself dared not cling to it and preferred
rather to abandon the theory. And now the experiment unexpectedly proved you to
be right …” (Kojevnikov, 1993, p. 64).
22 “Many of the developments which have been occurring in recent times have
been concerned with the introduction of new particles. There again we see that the
physicist had to overcome a prejudice. Up until about 1930 physicists thought that
there were only two fundamental particles, the electron and the proton. […] There
A.-M. Creţu / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 70 (2020) 28e38 31The identification of ‘holes’ with protons did not, however,
alleviate many, if any, of the initial concerns regarding the ‘± dif-
ficulty’. On the contrary, it immediately led to further difficulties
(e.g. symmetry violations) 19 which brought about an increasing
dislike of the hole theory. In fact:
In its first two years Dirac's hole theory was certainly not as
popular as Dirac's equation. It was flatly rejected by Bohr, who
maintained his view that the negative energy difficulty
announced a breakdown of fundamental concepts, and, in spite
of a short period of interest, it was mocked by Pauli (Darrigol,
1988, p. 238).
The difficulties introduced by the proton hypothesis were
mainly due to the mass asymmetry between the electron and the
proton. The mass asymmetry, however, was not the only problem
introduced by the hole theory. The identification of ‘holes’ with
protons would also lead to “paradoxes regarding conservation of
charge, momentum, and energy” (Moyer, 1981a, p. 1058) as well as
potential violations to the known stability of matter. Moreover,
considerations regarding the physical meaning of ‘spin’ would lead
some (e.g. Bohr) to believe that the negative-energy solutions show
a breakdown of various concepts at the quantum-relativistic level.
In particular, Bohr was worried that the “property called ‘spin’
could not be interpreted because there was no corresponding
classical property” (Moyer, 1981a, p. 1058). Fortunately, the ‘proton’
hypothesis was short-lived: in 1931 Dirac identified the hole with a
new kind of particle that should have the samemass as the electron
but positive charge: the anti-electron (i.e., the positron):
A hole, if there were one, would be a new kind of particle, un-
known to experimental physics, having the same mass and
opposite charge to an electron. We may call such a particle an
anti-electron. We would not expect to find any of them in na-
ture, on account of their rapid rate of recombination with
electrons, but if they could be produced experimentally in high
vacuum they would be quite stable and amenable to observa-
tion. An encounter between two hard g-rays (of energy at least
half a million volts) could lead to the creation simultaneously of
an electron and anti-electron, the probability of occurrence of
this process being of the same order of magnitude as that of the
collision of two g-rays on the assumption that they are spheres
of the same size as classical electrons. This probability is negli-
gible, however, with the intensities of g-rays at present avail-
able. The protons on the above view are quite unconnected with
electrons. Presumably the protons will have their own negative-
energy states, all of which normally are occupied, an unoccupied
one appearing as an anti-proton. Theory at present is quite
unable to suggest a reason why there should be any differences
between electrons and protons (Dirac, 1931, pp. 61e62).
Dirac's theoretical prediction of the anti-electron is unani-
mously recognised by physicists, historians of science, and philos-
ophers (Anderson, 1961; Griffiths, 2004; Hanson, 1961; Jacob, 1998;
Pais, 1998; Pashby, 2012) as the bone fide prediction of the positron.
However, at the time of the prediction, no experiments were yet
conducted to search for the anti-electron or positron, and Dirac's
theory was neither well received, nor was the association between
the subsequent experimental results immediately associated with
it. In fact, it would take a long time for Dirac's prediction to be taken19 “[…] the Dirac wave equation is symmetric with respect to negative and pos-
itive charges (electrons and anti-electrons), while nature shows no symmetry be-
tween the electron and the much heavier proton” (Kragh, 1990, p. 96).seriously. For example, Heilbron recollects of his interview with
P.M.S. Blackett that “[w]hen asked how long they had known about
Dirac's theory, Blackett replied he wasn't quite certain, but that it
didn't matter anyway because nobody took Dirac's theory seri-
ously” (Heilbron, 1962). Also, Chadwick, in an interview with
Wiener, recollects that “not a great deal of notice was taken at once
about this hole or positive electron e not a great deal, not until a
year or two later” (Weiner and Chadwick, 1969). Though it is hardly
controversial to claim that the authentication of the positron star-
ted with its theoretical prediction, recollections such as Chadwick's
and Blackett's suggest that the theoretical aspect of the authenti-
cation hindered, rather than helped the recognition of the positron
as a new particle of matter. Even when Anderson's experiments
were put forward, few if any associated the experimental evidence
with Dirac's prediction.20 It wasn't until Blackett and Occhialini's
experimental results were put forward that Dirac's theoretical
prediction started to be taken more seriously. However, Blackett
and Occhialini's experiments led neither to the immediate recog-
nition of the positron as a new particle of matter nor to the
confirmation of Dirac's theory. Their experiments, though received
with enthusiasm by some,21 led others to express a deep opposition
towards the experimental particle, and an even stronger opposition
to the equation of the experimental particle with the Dirac particle.
Though Dirac himself has suggested that experimentalists did
not see the ‘positron’ due to ‘prejudice’, and that it was also ‘prej-
udice’ that led Bohr, Pauli, and others to oppose the positron,22
there are reasons to resist this explanation. Bohr and Pauli were
not completely opposed to new particles since they already
accepted the neutron as a new particle of matter.23 Moreover, Bohr
was ready to part with the laws of conservation, an attitude any-
thing but conservative; whilst Pauli himself entertained the pos-
sibility of the existence of a new particle, i.e., the neutrino, again an
attitude that does not exude prejudice. Thus explaining the oppo-
sition of Bohr and Pauli towards the positron in terms of dogmatic
conservatism, cannot be the whole story. It is more likely that due
to the effects of crystallisation Pauli's and Bohr's opposition to the
authentication of the positron ought to be sought in the effect of the
positron on their working perspectives.
It has so far been shown that the prediction and discovery of the
positron took place against the background of crystallisation.
Despite three separate events suggesting the existence of the
positron e i.e., Dirac's theoretical prediction, Anderson's discovery,
Blackett’s and Occhialini's confirmatory experiments e this new
particle was not fully authenticated till the 7th Solvay Conference ofwas very strong reluctance to postulate new particles up until about that time. […]
Why did experimentalists not see them? Because they were prejudiced against
them” (Dirac, 1973, pp. 12e13).
23 Note that though the neutron's discovery did prompt a certain amount of
disagreement regarding its nature, the recognition of the neutron as a genuine
empirical phenomena, i.e., its authentication, preceded such disagreement.
25 Insightful remarks regarding Bohr's intellectual preoccupations can be gleaned
from Thomas Kuhn's, Aage Bohr's, and Leon Rosenfeld's interview with Margrethe
Bohr, which can be found in the AIP Archives, see Bohr et al. (1963).
26 John Hendry takes this to be the typical attitude of most physicists of the time,
A.-M. Creţu / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 70 (2020) 28e38321933. Whilst the existing historical and philosophical literature
provides a good deal of evidence for the existence of disagreements
in connection to the confirmation of the positron as a new particle
of matter, a definitive diagnosis of the causes of these disagree-
ments has yet to be established.
Hanson, for example, argues that “the discovery of the positive
electronwas a discovery of three different particles” (Hanson, 1961,
p. 194). Whilst his analysis provides insight into The Anderson
Particle, The Dirac Particle, and The Blackett-Occhialini Particle,
Hanson does not offer any definitive pronouncement with regard to
what led to the equation of the Dirac particle with the experimental
particle. In addition to Hanson's three particles, Darrigol, (1988),
and in passing Roque, (1997), draw attention to a fourth particle
with positive charge, mass similar to the electron's, but of integer
spin, i.e., the Bose-positron. This was an interpretative hypothesis
emerging on the back of Anderson's experiments, which albeit
short lived was for some time regarded as a possible solution to
some of the conceptual and empirical problems of the early 1930's.
Darrigol draws attention to the disagreement regarding the inter-
pretation of the experimental results and highlights the fact that a
number of physicists were reluctant to equate the experimentally
discovered particle (i.e., Anderson's positive electron) with the
theoretically ‘discovered’ particle (i.e., Dirac's anti-electron).24
Roque, in an insightful account of how the positron was estab-
lished as a new particle, calls attention to a deeper disagreement
regarding the status of cosmic rays experiments, which were used
to obtain the famous photographs of positron tracks published by
Anderson in 1932. According to Roque, serious doubt was enter-
tained with regard to “the evidential weight of experiments
involving cosmic rays” (Roque, 1997, p. 85), urging researchers to
findmeans of producing “positive electrons bymeans of radioactive
sources, rather than undependable cosmic rays” (Roque, 1997, p.
88). Roque thus argues that it was the successful ‘manufacture’ that
resolved the disagreements.
Finally, Pashby, (2012), in an incisive paper on Dirac's prediction
of the positron, provides additional reasons for concern regarding
the debate over the theoretical identity of the positron. Whilst
forcefully arguing that Dirac's prediction of the positron ought to be
seen as a bone fide theoretical prediction, and hardly anyone would
deny this, he also points out that “in the conceptual framework of
the hole theory, there could be no antimatter without the Dirac sea’
(Pashby, 2012, p. 462), and hence no positron either. Pashby thus
emphasises the importance of the theoretical side of the debate
regarding the identity of the positron.
The existing literature notwithstanding, a diagnosis of the dis-
agreements has yet to be established. What I suggest is that the
disagreements regarding the positron are less mystifying if they are
understood in the context of authentication within crystallisation.
Crystallisation leads physicists to reevaluate core assumptions and
this reevaluation, in turn, can impede authentication. Thus whilst
Roque is right to suggest that the slow authentication of the posi-
tron can be attributed to the need of “manufacturing positrons”,
this can only be a partial diagnosis. To account for the theoretical
disagreements, the resistance on the part of leading physicists such
as Pauli and Bohr to the identification of the experimental particle
with the Dirac particle must be accounted for. In the following
section, it will be argued that their attitudes can be shown to be
neither dogmatic nor mysterious, provided that they are under-
stood in the context of authentication within crystallisation.24 See Darrigol, 1988, p. 2385. Perspectives
Throughout 1933 leading physicists such as Bohr and Pauli were
sceptical of the experiments involving positrons and opposed the
identification of the experimental particle with Dirac's theoretical
prediction. Barring dogmatic conservatism, their attitudes are
strikingly puzzling. Why did they oppose so vehemently and for
such a long time the identification of the experimental particlewith
Dirac's prediction? This section is dedicated to an examination of
Pauli's and Bohr's respective perspectives from which a richer
explanation of their attitudes towards the positron is to be estab-
lished. However, beforewe examine inmore detail Bohr's and Pauli’
perspectives, a few clarifications on perspectives themselves are in
order.
It is useful to examine scientists' epistemic attitude towards a
particular conceptual or empirical problem by first understanding
their ‘perspective’. The perspective of a scientist encompasses both
their theoretical interests and their background theoretical
knowledge. First, in regard to interests, it is worth emphasising that
scientists can, at any given point, apply themselves to a number of
different conceptual or empirical problems. Second, in regard to
background theoretical knowledge, it is useful to note that in
attempting to resolve any conceptual or empirical problem, scien-
tists will have at their disposal the background assumptions of the
research tradition, as well as less entrenched and less general as-
sumptions pertaining to the relevant solutions they're working on
in relation to the problems they apply themselves to. It is worth
reemphasising that the notion of perspective used here is an
epistemic one, referring to a scientist's theoretical stance and not to
their subjective, or idiosyncratic attitude. A scientist's perspective,
particularly in periods of crystallisation, may lead them to respond
differentially to the same empirical knowledge. By examining
Bohr's and Pauli's perspectives within the context of crystallisation
it will be shown that their attitudes are neither dogmatically con-
servative nor mysterious.5.1. Bohr's perspective
Bohr belonged to the class of scientists who have a wide
appreciation and understanding of the problems concerning the
entire field to which they belong, not counting a range of adjacent
(i.e., pertaining to other sciences, particularly chemistry and
biology) and non-adjacent problems (i.e., social, cultural, etc.).25
Through his visitors at the Copenhagen institute, through his cor-
respondence, and through academic journals, Bohr liked to keep
track of developments in physics and other sciences, even though
such developments may not have been strictly relevant to his own
research interests.26 As regards his research interests, they were as
varied as his intellectual reach. This notwithstanding, it is plausible
to suggest that in the early '30s he was primarily interested in the
structure of the atomic nucleus and the b-decay puzzles.27 His in-
terest in these problems did not stop him from suggesting solutions
to related problems, though, as will become apparent below,claiming that “[even though they may have published only within restricted areas,
most physicists took their perception of the problem complex from the wider field
of their reading, correspondence and conversation” (Hendry, 1984, p. 6).
27 Victor Weisskopf, for example, writes that Niels Bohr's work “can be divided
into four periods”, where “[t]he third period, 1930e1940, was devoted to the
application of the new quantum concepts to electromagnetic phenomena and the
exploration of the structure of the nucleus” (Weisskopf, 1984, pp. 584e585).
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possible import to the main problems he was interested in.
Having heard fromGamowabout the ‘± difficulty’, Bohr wrote to
Dirac to ask for details, confessing that he is interested in this
problem in connection to the b-decay problem, particularly “as
regards conservation of energy in b-ray disintegration and the
interior of stars” (Bohr, 1986, p. 547). In the same letter, he also
suggested that just as in nuclear problems, “an essential limitation
of the principles of conservation of energy and momentum” (p.
548) might have to be faced, a departure from these principles
might also be of use in solving the ‘± difficulty’. Dirac, as we know,
resisted this suggestion and in his letter to Bohr made it plain that
he prefers “to keep rigorous conservation of energy at all costs and
would rather abandon even the concept of matter consisting of
separate atoms and electrons than the conservation of energy”.28
The conservation of energy principle “had been in the history of
physics an ever trustworthy guide” (Darrigol, 1988), yet, as Helge
Kragh writes, “[in] the light of experimental anomalies and con-
ceptual difficulties related to relativistic quantummechanics [Bohr]
foresaw a drastic revision of fundamental physics, with strict en-
ergy conservation being one of the necessary sacrifices” (Kragh,
2017, p. 126). We can already see that crystallisation invited the
reevaluation of core assumptions such as the conservation of en-
ergy principle, yet against the background of crystallisation, Bohr's
attitude is very far from being dogmatically conservative.
Bohr was coming to the problem of the negative energy solu-
tions, via a perspective different from Dirac's and was more con-
cerned with how Dirac's equation might bear on nuclear electrons
and the problem of b-decay, than he was concerned with Dirac's
hole theory as such. Bohr returned to the ‘± difficulty’ again and
again, though on every occasion it was in connection to either the
structure of the nucleus or the problem of b-decay. Bohr continues
to ‘upset’ the energy conservation throughout the early '30s and
refers to this possibility again in his 1933 Solvay report, restating
that he only “advocated that one seriously consider the idea of a
possible failure of the theorems of conservation of energy and
momentum in connection with the continuous b-ray spectra” and
in order to “emphasise the total inadequacy of the classical con-
ceptual edifice for treating this problem” (Bohr, 1996, p. 191). It is
clear from Bohr's remarks that the path of reevaluating core as-
sumptions was not to be excluded in a period of crystallisation.
Bohr's attitude to developments in connection to the ‘± diffi-
culty’ did not change much throughout the early ‘30s since these
developments were not presenting any viable solutions to either
the problem of b-decay or to the structure of the nucleus. Dirac's
prediction of the positron was largely ignored and it is plausible to
suggest that insofar as Bohr is concerned his doubts regarding the
positron are due to the fact that this new particle did not help
resolve any of the problems he concerned himself with. His
perspective, though different from Dirac's, was shaped by different
concerns and a different, non-conservative attitude towards the
reevaluation of background assumptions.29 He continued to doubt
Dirac's positron even after Blackett and Occhialini's report
confirmed Anderson's findings and tentatively put forward a28 Dirac's remark is cited in Kragh (1990), p. 90 and the full letter can be found in
Bohr (1986), p. 548e550.
29 A similar point is made by John Hendry, who notes that “[t]he physicists con-
cerned with a particular set of problems did not share the same influences and
concerns; each one approached the current issues, both technical and philosoph-
ical, from a different framework” (Hendry, 1984, p. 4).
30 In a footnote to a letter to Peierls, dated May 22, 1933, Pauli reports that “[w]
hen I saw him in March, he [Bohr] absolutely rejected the positive electron and
thought that Blackett had just produced some ‘pathological photographs’” (Bohr,
1996, p. 468).connection between the experimental results and Dirac's hole
theory.30 In April 1933 he wrote the following to Oskar Klein:
Regarding the positive electrons I cannot, however, quite share
your enthusiasm. I am at least as yet very sceptical as regards the
interpretation of Blackett's photographs, and am afraid that it
will take a long time before we can have any certain knowledge
about the existence or non-existence of the positive electrons.
Nor as regards the applicability of Dirac's theory to this problem,
I feel certain, or more correctly, I doubt it, at least for the
moment (cited in Roque 1997, p. 76).31
Bohr continued to be suspicious of the identification of the
experimental particle with the Dirac particle throughout 1933. His
attitude, far from being mysterious, was due to a number of factors
that could not easily be put into a consistent picture. First, he ex-
pected that the transition from “the physics of the atoms to that of
nuclei may involve the sacrifice of some fundamental principle,
namely energy conservation” (Enz, 2002, p. 214). Second, he
initially believed that Blackett's and Occhialini's photographs were
‘pathological photographs’, a belief which, as Roque points out, was
not unfounded, since “Irene Curie and Frederic Joliot had previously
disregarded positively curved tracks as experimental artefacts, and
Millikan had dismissed Anderson's original conclusions on the
same grounds, prompting him to check on turbulence” (Roque,
1997, p. 85). Third, Blackett's and Occhialini's interpretation was
tied to Dirac's hole theory, of which Bohr thought that it was “not a
theory that one can believe in”32 for a variety of reasons (i.e.,
formalism, measurement issues etc.). These different problems and
assumptions shaped a perspective which led Bohr to resist the
authentication of the positron.5.2. Pauli's perspective
The story of the positron cannot be told without an account of
Pauli's reactions and views towards the events that shaped its
authentication. Not only because “everyone was eager to learn
about Pauli's always forcefully and humorously expressed reactions
to new discoveries and ideas, and his likes and dislikes of the
prospects opened” (Bohr 1960, p. 3), but, more importantly,
because Pauli was an outspoken critic of Dirac's hole theory from
the outset.33 He did not believe in Dirac's prediction and he
maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the positron even after
the discovery experiments were put forward, writing to Blackett
that he doesn't “believe on the Dirac-‘holes’, even if the positive
electron exist” (sic)34 and to Dirac that he doesn't believe in his
“perception of ‘holes’, even if the existence of the ‘antielectron’ is
proved”.35 Pauli's attitude, however, is neither mystifying, nor
dogmatically conservative or due to prejudice. On the contrary,
understood against the background of crystallisation, Pauli's31 Rudolf Peierls recollects the same attitude, noting that “[e]even after the dis-
covery of the positron, which behaved exactly as Dirac had predicted a hole would
behave, Bohr was cautious and urged that it should not be taken for granted that
this was the right interpretation of the new particle” (Peierls, 1985, p. 58).
32 Bohr's remark as reported by Rosenfeld in his interview with Oskar Klein, see
Heilbron et al. (1963).
33 Massimi, for example, notes that “[s]ince its inception, Pauli had strongly
opposed Dirac's hole picture as unphysical and counterintuitive, to the extent of
welcoming Elsasser's hypothesis of the positron as an integral spin (or null spin)
particle following Bose-statistics instead of Fermi-Dirac statistics” (Massimi, 2005,
p. 133).
34 Pauli, Letter to Blackett, 19 April 1933, Pauli, 1985, p. 158.
35 Pauli, Letter to Dirac, 1 May 1933, Pauli, 1985, p. 159.
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shown in what follows.
Pauli, like Bohr, liked to maintain a comprehensive view of the
field. As one of his assistants recalls, [o]ne of the remarkable things
about Pauli, really […] is that he read everything. Everything!”
(Uhlenbeck and Kuhn, 1962). It is not surprising then that the
“negative energy states of the Dirac equation […] intrigued Pauli
enormously” (Enz, 2002, p. 221). The ‘± difficulty’ did not, however,
interest Pauli as much as other problems, such as the structure of the
nucleus and the b-decay problem.36 He applied himself to both of
these problems by “adhering to the already established laws of en-
ergy conservation and of quantised angular momentum, making the
necessary adjustments in the objects, namely by proposing as work-
ing hypothesis the neutrino and the nuclear spin” (Enz, 2002, p. 228).
Pauli's attitude towards the new realm of the nucleus, was not like
Bohr's that of abandoning well established laws. He thought instead
that “[w]ith nuclear processes, even almost more important than the
conservation laws of energy and momentum […] are the conserva-
tion laws of all discreetly quantised quantities”.37 Pauli preferred to
“hold fast unconditionally to these assumptions and to pursue them
in their consequences”38 before modifying them.39 In connection to
the positron, the set of assumptions and problems of which Pauli's
perspective consisted, played an important role in shaping his atti-
tude towards its authentication. We can see these connections, i.e.,
strong adherence to entrenched background assumptions such as the
conservation and symmetry laws as well as a commitment to the
neutrino hypothesis, reiterated in his personal correspondence
throughout 1933. In May, he writes the following to Peierls:
Furthermore, it is probable that the positive electron has integer
(perhaps zero) spin and Bose statistics. This could, however, be
deduced from the conservation laws (and from the empirical fact
that the mass number of nuclei uniquely determines their sta-
tistics and the integer or half-integer character of their spin) only
if one knew that an uneven number of them can be created in an
elementary process. It would be desirable for experimenters to
determine precisely the elementary process in which the posi-
tive electron is created. The idea that the positive electron obeys
Bose statistics first came to Elsasser (albeit for different reasons)
and I encouraged him to send a note on the matter to Nature.
(The fact that this aspect is opposed to Dirac's hole theory only
speaks for it. For experience shows that positive and negative
charge do not act exactly the same and I do not like at all moving
this asymmetry into the initial state of the world, as Dirac does).
(Letter to Peierls, 22 May 1933, translation by Alexander Blum in
personal correspondence, full letter in Pauli, 1985, pp. 163e165.)
Note that finding an explanation that would preserve both the
conservation laws and the empirically established symmetry
principle led Pauli to a differential interpretation of the discovery
experiments. Being immersed in problems regarding the structure
of the atomic nucleus, Pauli briefly entertained the Bose interpre-
tation of the experimental particle.40 The Bose-positron hypothesis,36 Darrigol, for example, notes that during the early '30, Pauli “indulged too much
in nuclear electrons” (Darrigol, 1988, p. 247).
37 Quoted in Enz (2002), p. 228, full letter in Pauli (1985), p. 184.
38 Id.
39 According to Enz, “Pauli was an unconditional believer in conservation laws”
((Enz, 2002), p. 254).
40 Pauli expresses his preference for a Bose-positron in a letter to Peierls dated 22
May 1933, as well as in a letter to Heisenberg dated 16 June 1933. A further letter to
Heisenberg, dated 14 July 1933, marks the abandonment of the Bose-positron hy-
pothesis, but is particularly instructive in explaining the different problems and
advantages associated with the Bose-positron. For the full letters see Pauli, (1985).whilst making the proton a composite particle, would also restore
the elementarity of the neutron, a contentious issue at the time.
However, more importantly, this hypothesis would help clear away
some of the mysteries concerning b decay: if the proton were to
decay into a neutron and a Bose-positron the conservation of
angular momentum would also be restored.41 It is plausible to
suggest that Pauli's opposition to Dirac's positron was due to the
fact that it did not shed light on either the nuclear puzzles or b
decay. To Pauli, the possibility of the experimental particle obeying
Bose-Einstein statistics was appealing for yet another reason: it
supported his own hypothesis about a new kind of particle that
“carries out” the missing energy in b decay: his neutrinomight be
a combination of a Bose-positron and an electron and this in turn
would help maintain conservation of energy as well as solving the
spin statistics anomalies. In this connection, he tells Peierls, that,
When nuclear physics is concerned, I would again believe in the
conservation laws - not only those of energy, momentum (and of
course charge), but also of angular momentum and the sym-
metry characteristic (Bose or Fermi) of the whole system. As my
early conjecture of the existence of “neutrinos” and its emission
via beta-decay has been strengthened by the discovery of the
positive electron. (Letter to Peierls, 22 May 1933, translation by
Radin Dardashti in personal correspondence, full letter in Pauli
(1985), pp. 163e165).
By mid June, Pauli still resisted the association between the
discovered particle and the Dirac particle, citing similar reasons as
he gave to Peierls, in a letter to Heisenberg:
I do not believe in hole theory, because I wish to have an
asymmetry between positive and negative charge in the laws of
nature (it does not satisfy me to move the empirically observed
asymmetry into the initial state of the world). Elsasser has
voiced the hypothesis that the positive electrons might obey
Bose statistics and have spin 0 or 1. I do not think that this can be
excluded. Indeed, the fact that this would cause difficulties for
Dirac's theory makes me like this hypothesis'. (Letter to Hei-
senberg, 16 June 1933, translation by Alexander Blum in per-
sonal correspondence, full letter in Pauli (1985), p. 169.)
By mid July 1933, Pauli gave up the Bose-positron idea, but he
was still reluctant to equate the experimental particle with Dirac's
theoretical prediction. It is worth noting that despite an intense
interest in Dirac's equation and the hole theory, Pauli had mis-
givings about both from the beginning.42 As Blum notes, “[w]hat
bothered him most was the fact that it appeared to place the
asymmetry between positive and negative charge in the initial
conditions (i.e., the occupied negative energy states) rather than in
the physical laws […]” (Blum, 2014, p. 550). From Pauli’ viewpoint,
potential violations to conservation laws in b-decay also spoke
against Dirac's positron, as did the formalism of the hole theory, for41 Pauli's brief preference for the Bose-positron, along with the reasons and im-
plications of this preference are discussed in Jensen 2000, pp 172e173, Massimi,
2005, pp. 133e134, see also fn. 78, and Darrigol, 1988, p. 257. Note that as Darri-
gol mentions, the idea of building the “nuclei with neutrons and Bose positrons
rather than with protons and neutrons” was still supported by Francis Perrin in
September 1933, though he was convinced by others to abandon it. The point here
is that such suggestions did not seem impossible in the context of rapid changes
and discoveries characteristic of crystallisation.
42 Blum, in particular, stresses this point in connection to symmetry violations:
“The most prominent critic of the Dirac equation, and of hole theory in particular,
was Pauli. He was unsatisfied with hole theory from the start” (Blum, 2014, p. 550).
A.-M. Creţu / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 70 (2020) 28e38 35which Pauli used the “deprecatory term ‘subtraction physics’”
(Wentzel, 1960).
This succession of events suggests that Pauli's attitude, far from
being due to prejudice against new particles, was instead shaped by
carefully weighing his background assumptions against viable so-
lutions to pressing conceptual and empirical problems in a period
of crystallisation. Pauli did not believe in Dirac's anti-electron
because the anti-electron was inherently tied to the hole theory,
a theory that although he preoccupied himself with for a few years
(even after the positron's authentication),43 he opposed it most of
the time. And, he resisted Blackett's interpretation of the experi-
mental results because it did not lead to viable solutions to the
pressing conceptual and empirical problems he wished solved.
Thus Pauli's reluctance, was not to one particle, but to two particles.
Pauli's views exerted a certain influence in the community, since
physicists “always benefitted by Pauli's comments even if
disagreement could temporarily prevail”, but as Bohr notes, “if he
felt he had to change his views, he admitted it most gracefully, and
accordingly it was a great comfort when new developments met
with his approval”.44 Pauli's change of heart regarding the positron,
like his intermittent opposition to the positron throughout 1933,
can be accounted for by understanding his perspective during
crystallisation, in particular the problems he cared to solve and the
theoretical assumptions he upheld. Bohr's remark only serves to
provide additional support to the fact that Pauli's attitude was
shaped by a concern with solutions to problems and not by prej-
udice or ‘personal animosity’. Pauli's biographer ponders “[w]hy
this personal animosity towards an abstractmatter [i.e., Dirac's hole
theory], one may ask, particularly since this theory was such a
success in explaining the properties of the spinning electron? This
is a difficult question to answer, even when considering that Pauli
liked shocking language in his private statements” (Enz, 2002, p.
295). As shown, Pauli's attitude was neither due to personal ani-
mosity nor exceedingly mysterious or difficult to account for.
By having examined the perspectives of Pauli and Bohr
throughout 1933 we have gleaned some of the factors that
prompted their reluctance to first, accept the positron as a new
particle of matter; and second, to resist the equation of the Dirac
particle with the experimental particle. Both Bohr and Pauli
changed their attitude towards the positron by the end of 1933.
Their changing perspectives, occasioned by certain developments
prior to the 7th Solvay Conference, as well as by the discussions
during the conference, have not yet been investigated. In the
following section, the unfolding of the 7th Solvay Conference is
therefore traced to glean further insights of Bohr's and Pauli's
changing perspectives.45 The quote from Pauli's letter to Paul Langevin is reproduced in Kragh (1990), p.
146. See also Darrigol, (1988) and Roque, (1997) for reports on the 7th Solvay
conference.6. Authentication
Abraham Pais claims that “the positron theory as a serious
discipline started in October 1933 with Dirac's address to the 7th
Solvay Conference” (Pais, 1989, p. 98), whilst Bohr opens his Solvay
remarks by praising “[t]he wonderful confirmation which Dirac's
theory of the electron has received through the discovery of the
positron” (Bohr, 1996, p. 183). Both suggest that the long authen-
tication processes of the positron ended at the Solvay conference.
Yet despite Bohr's remarks and Pais' statement, the discussions
during the Solvay conference were still against the identification of
the experiments with Dirac's theoretical prediction. It is more43 Pauli, in collaboration with his assistant at the time, Victor Weisskopf, wrote an
‘anti-Dirac’ paper (Pauli and Weisskopf, 1934), which was meant to avoid Dirac's
‘subtraction physics’.
44 See Bohr's Foreword to the Pauli Memorial volume, (Bohr, 1960, p. 3).accurate to suggest that the necessary developments that led to the
protracted equation of Dirac's prediction of the positron with the
experimental positron were indeed set in motion at the Solvay
conference, so in a sense the discussions did mark ‘the beginning of
the positron as a serious discipline’. But it would be misleading,
despite Bohr's pronouncement, to take the Solvay conference as the
locus of the positron's authentication. Bohr's and Pauli's in-
terventions in connection to the positron, far from taking the ex-
periments to confirm Dirac's prediction, suggested the contrary.
They were both still sceptical of the identification of Dirac's theo-
retical prediction to the experimental particle, as will be shown
below. It will be suggested, however, that developments with re-
gard to the structure of the nucleus and the b-decay problem forced
Bohr and Pauli to further rethink some of their previous assump-
tions and to reevaluate their stance towards the positron.
The 7th Solvay Conference on the “Structure and properties of
the atomic nucleus” which took place between October 22nd e
October 29th, 1933, in Bruxelles brought together some of the most
influential physicists at the time, many of which were involved in
one way or another in the positron story. As the title of the con-
ference indicates, the main discussions revolved around the
structure of the atomic nucleus with remarks on the positron oc-
casionally looming in reports and in the discussions. In fact, Dirac's
own report was a late addition to the conference's agenda, mainly
due to an intervention of Pauli's.45 Whilst he was an ardent critic of
the hole theory, Pauli thought that a “report on the development of
the hole theory and its relationship with the positive electron”
(Pauli, letter to Langevin, cited in Kragh,1990, p.146), shorter and as
a supplement to Heisenberg's report, would be most desirable and
also useful for “the general discussion of the theory of nuclei” (id.).
The fact that Dirac was only invited due to Pauli's intervention,
already suggests that little was hoped to be gained from Dirac's
theory of holes in regard to the positron.
The conference commenced with Langevin's opening remarks,
followed by Cockcroft's report on the disintegration of elements by
accelerated protons, Chadwick's report touching on the neutron
discovery, and the Joliot-Curie's report on artificial radioactivity
(Mehra, 1975, ch. 8, Gauthier-Villars, 1935). Whilst Chadwick's
report contributes towards ‘expelling’ the electrons from the nu-
cleus,46 the Joliot-Curie's report offers further evidence of pair
production, and thus of the existence of positrons.
Dirac's report at the Solvay conference was preceded by a
favourable discussion by Blackett on the positive electron and its
properties. Blackett's report drew mainly from the experimental
data and he “tactfully […] discussed pair creation and annihilation in
terms of the conservation of charge and energy alone” (Roque, 1997,
p. 107). Whilst mostly favourable to Dirac, Blackett is fairly cautious
in straightforwardly asserting that Dirac's theory has been conclu-
sively confirmed by the experiments as can be seen from his remark:
Dirac's theory of the electron predicted particles with exactly
the same properties, and so, the experiments provide some
powerful support to the essential correctness of Dirac's theory.
(author's translation from Solvay Reports)4746 Brown and Rechenberg Brown and Rechenberg (1988) point out that, in places,
Chadwick's report still suggests a composite neutron.
47 “La theorie de l’electron de Dirac avait predit l'existence de particules ayant
exactement ces mêmes proprietes, de sorte que les resultats de l'experience
apportent un puissant appui en faveur de l'exactitude de la theorie de Dirac quant a
son essence” (Gauthier-Villars, 1935, p. 172).
A.-M. Creţu / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 70 (2020) 28e3836Despite Blackett's confidence in Dirac's theory, a rather intense
opposition to establishing a strong link between the hole theory
and the experiments on the positive electron is apparent in the
discussions. In particular, Blackett's arguments regarding the pos-
itive electron's spin, which would decisively show that the exper-
imental particle is a Fermi-Dirac particle and hence should be
equated with Dirac's prediction, were received with hostility by
both Bohr and Pauli as their comments clearly suggest:
[Bohr] It is of utmost importance to learn, as Monsieur Blackett
learns, to draw as many conclusions as possible from experi-
ments on positive electrons, without having to appeal to Dirac's
theory. I believe that the conclusion regarding charge is justified,
but the conclusion regarding spin seems to me less certain.
(author's translation from Solvay Reports)48
[Pauli] As opposed to what Monsieur Bohr thinks, I think that
Monsieur Blackett's conclusion regarding the charge of the
positive electron could not in any way be considered as more
certain than his conclusion regarding its spin. (author's trans-
lation from Solvay Reports)49
It is important to note that “at the Solvay congress of 1933 Bohr
still resisted the evidence vindicating Dirac's anti-electron and
contemplated the possibility that the positron's spin would differ
from one half” (Darrigol, 1988, p. 256). In the discussions following
Blackett's report on the positive electron, it is evident that Bohr and
Pauli equally pressed Blackett for details on how the numerous
conclusions with regard to the properties of the experimental par-
ticle could be derivedwithout appealing to Dirac's hole theory. Bohr,
in particular, was still doubtful of the physical interpretation of spin,
especially because such a property did not make much sense in the
classical theory. For different reasons, Pauli resisted Blackett's ar-
guments and in particular the suggestion that the experiments
ought to be taken as a confirmation of Dirac's hole theory.
Blackett's Solvay report failed to offer a definite theoretical
identity to the positive electron. His proposed interpretation of the
experimental results was not unquestioningly received. Besides
Bohr and Pauli, Rutherford was also dissatisfied with the inter-
pretation of the experiments. Whilst praising Blackett's experi-
mental work, he expressed his concern with regard to the
possibility that the experiments were influenced by Dirac's theory
and he confessed that it would have been desirable to interpret the
experiments without appeal to a preexisting theory.50 More ques-
tions and comments followed, some leading to lengthy discussions
and raising more suspicion with regard to the interpretation of the
experimental results. In particular, a comment of Perrin's regarding48 “Il est de la plus haute importance d'essayer, comme le fait M. Blackett, de tirer
des conclusions aussi nombreuses que possible d'experiences sur les electrons
positifs, sans devoir recourir a la theorie de Dirac. Je pense que la conclusion
relative a la charge est juste, mais celle concernant le spin me semble moins cer-
taine. En realite, comme c'est la presence du champ nucleaire qui permet au
quantum de lumiere incident de produire les deux particules, il n'st pas du tout
exclu que le noyau prenne part au mecanisme de la conservation du moment
angulaire” (Bohr's comment to Blackett's report at the Solvay Conference in
Gauthier-Villars (1935), p. 175.).
49 “Contrairement a ce que pense M. Bohr, je suis d'avis que la conclusion de M.
Blackett concernant la charge de l’electron positif ne saurait en aucune façon être
consideree comme plus certain que celle concernant son spin” (Pauli's comment to
Blackett's report at the Solvay Conference in Gauthier-Villars (1935), p. 175.).
50 “Il me semble qu’a certains regards il est regrettable que nous ayons eu une
theorie de l’electron positif avant le debut des experiences. M. Blackett a fait son
possible pour ne pas se laisser influencer par la theorie, mais la façon d'envisager
les resultats doit inevitablement être influencee par la theorie etait venue apres
l’etablissement experimental des faits” (Rutherford, comment to Blackett's report
on the positive electron, in Gauthier-Villars (1935), p. 178).the conservation of energy in the process of producing positrons
stirred even more dissatisfaction from Bohr and Pauli.
Blackett, however, like Irene Curie, also reported on pair pro-
duction, with Blackett arguing that the production of a positive
electron is not a nuclear phenomena, and hence pairs are created
outside the nucleus (cf. Gauthier-Villars, 1935, pp. 170e171).
Blackett's hypothesis is reinforced by one of Lise Meitner's in-
terventions in which she supports the idea that “positrons, unlike
beta electrons, did not emerge from the nucleus” (Guerra& Robotti,
2018, p.101),51 an idea embraced by Pauli, but opposed by Bohr. The
idea that positron and electron pairs were produced outside the
nucleus strengthened an already existing, though not predominant,
suggestion according towhich the electronwas not a component of
the nucleus. Most importantly, though, it lent further support to
Dirac's prediction, as Dirac had already envisaged in his 1931 paper
‘the creation simultaneously of an electron and anti-electron’. Pair
production, had yet other implications not only in connection to the
structure of the nucleus, which would no longer contain electrons,
but also in connection to b decay. Themissing energy in b decay
could be attributed to the neutrino, a hypothesis favoured by Pauli,
though not by Bohr.
Dirac's own report, entitled “Theory of the Positron”, followed
Blackett's report. Rather surprisingly, Dirac's report did not
perpetuate the discussion about positive electrons and their
properties. Most questions were in connection to internal problems
of the hole theory, or with regard to certain calculations which
Dirac had not yet made. One of Bohr's comments in particular,
showcases once again, however, his hostile attitude towards the
hole theory. In this comment, Bohr questions the very possibility
that, at least some of the consequences of Dirac's hole theory will
ever be vindicated by experiments.52
Bohr's attitude changes dramatically towards the end of the
discussions; he starts his general remarks by praising “[t]he
wonderful confirmation which Dirac's theory of the electron has
received through the discovery of the positron” (Bohr, 1996, p. 183).
This change of heart, though likely prompted by the discussions,
may have, in fact, occurred after the Solvay Conference as “the
published proceedings were in the making for at least 4 months
after Solvay's guests left their rooms at the Hôtel Metropole, even
though the discussions following the reports were printed as if they
were direct transcriptions, and preserved a casual tone” (Roque,
1997, p. 106). Moreover, “[i]n February 1934 speakers were sent
the galley proofs and gave the final touches to their interventions e
4 months after the event, then as now not a negligible time gap in
physics” (Roque, 1997, p. 107). Short of a miraculous conversion to
the Dirac particle, Roque attributes Bohr's and Pauli's changing
attitudes to “theoretical and experimental practices employed in its
manufacture, and then legitimated by discovery accounts that
emphasised the coherence of Dirac, Anderson, and Blackett and
Occhialini's work” (Roque, 1997, p. 115). However, it is equally likely
that it was not only “manufacture and coherence efforts” that led to
the authentication of the positron. Insofar as Bohr and Pauli are
concerned negotiating the contribution of the positron to the
problems they wished to solve, as well as the reevaluation of
certain assumptions and of pending problems and solutions against
the post Solvay Conference background, can be said to equally
define their changing attitudes towards the positron.
The Solvay Conference marked the abandonment of certain
prior assumptions and welcomed the arrival of new ones. During51 For Meitner's comment, see Gauthier-Villars, 1935, pp. 175e176.
52 “Je me demande si, en somme, une verification experimentale de ces con-
sequences de la theorie des lacunes doit être regardee comme possible ou non”,
Bohr's comment to Dirac's Solvay report, in Gauthier-Villars (1935), p. 178.
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electrons cannot be confined within the nucleus and hence the
assumption that the nucleus was constituted by a proton and an
electron was belatedly abandoned. In light of experimental evi-
dence attesting the existence of the positrons, as well as the dis-
covery of Chadwick's neutron, the belief that there are only two
elementary constituents of matter, was also abandoned. Some
things stayed the same, such as the energy conservation principle,
whilst others were enthusiastically received. For example, the
“newly discovered process of electron positron creation” (Darrigol,
1988, p. 261) led to fruitful new hypothesis regarding b decay and
nuclear constitutionwhilst Pauli's neutrino idea gained ground and
was later fruitfully exploited by Fermi.53 All these results of the
reports and discussions of the Solvay Conference can be taken to
support the suggestion that Bohr's and Pauli's conversion to the
Dirac particle was not a miraculous conversion, but instead stem-
med from a reevaluation of their relevant perspectives. Both Bohr
and Pauli embraced the mechanism of pair production and with it
they accepted the existence of Dirac's positron. Both also sub-
scribed to the new structure of the nucleus without the electron as
a permanent inhabitant, and welcomed the rapid proliferation of
(some) new particles. Both scientists abandoned some of their
theoretical commitments and adopted new ones. All these changes
mark rational shifts in the epistemic attitudes of unprejudiced
scientists, who resisted the authentication of the positron for good
epistemic reasons.54 Whilst it may be cautious not to take the
Solvay Conference as the very final step in the authentication of the
positron, the reports and discussions certainly set in motion the
relevant steps towards welcoming the positron as a new particle of
matter.7. Concluding remarks
The historical case study of the positron is both a blessing and a
curse. The short, yet fascinating, early history of the positron has
already lent itself to a number of philosophically rich analyses, in
particular on the complex nature of experiments (Roque, 1997) and
the structure of novel predictions (Pashby, 2012). Here we have
sought to glean further insights regarding the authentication of the
positron. This is the blessing. The curse, as one might have guessed,
resides, amongst other things, in the precarious nature of any final
pronouncements as regards physicists' perspectives towards
authentication during crystallisation. Barring final pro-
nouncements, it was shown, however, that the physicists' attitudes
towards the authentication of the positron are neither mystifying
nor based upon dogmatic conservatism, but that their attitudes are
both reasonable and perfectly explicable if seen in the context of
crystallisation.
All scientific developments, not least the authentication of a
new particle, take place within the historical context of a research
tradition, and are viewed by the scientists of the day from a range of
perspectives. When the research tradition in question is within a
period of crystallisation, where basic concepts are being reeval-
uated, scientists with different perspectives may respond differ-
entially to the same empirical knowledge, and this in turn may
serve to make any process of authentication more fraught.53 Soon after the Solvay Conference Fermi formulated a theory of b decay for
which he sought publication in Nature. His note was not accepted by Nature due to
its speculative character so it was instead published in La Ricerca Scientifica towards
the end of December 1933.
54 It is plausible to understand these shifts in terms of rational changes in the
credences a scientist assigns to relevant theoretical hypotheses. I am indebted to an
anonymous referee for pointing this out.Recognising this general pattern, which is well illustrated by the
present discussion of the case of the positron, can help us under-
stand the causes of certain types of scientific disagreements, and in
doing so refine our narratives of scientific discovery in a manner
more sensitive to both the peculiarities of the context and the
diverse perspectives of the cast.Acknowledgements
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